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Shawn Warren reflects on Kraft’s  
glocalisation transformation
By Srinivas K. Reddy 
In late 2005, Shawn Warren, head of 
biscuits, Asia Pacific for Kraft, was in 
desperate need of a quick turnaround 
strategy. Oreo, after nearly 10 years in 
the China market was facing the imminent 
disaster of being completely pulled from 
the shelves. Local retail channels, along 
with company headquarters near Chicago, 
had finally grown impatient of the iconic 
product’s lacklustre sales. 
When Warren described the 
turnaround in March 2012, he said, “The 
first step to solving a problem is to admit 
you have one. We are committed to have 
this brand and put resources behind it.”
framing the context
Oreo, first sold by Nabisco in Hoboken, 
New Jersey in 1912, had become a classic 
fixture of Americana. Over time, Nabisco 
built an international presence with Oreo 
and increased the size of that product’s 
packaging as demand for it grew in both the 
United States and overseas markets. 
In 1996, Nabisco entered into the 
increasingly liberalised and rapidly-
growing China market. Four years later, 
Phillip Morris, a U.S. based tobacco 
company, acquired Nabisco and merged it 
with several other food companies under 
the Kraft banner. The merged company had 
a diverse product portfolio of some of the 
most well-known brands in the world. At 
that time, Mary Chun, the brand manager 
at Oreo China, commented to Warren 
about the merger, “One big difference was 
that Kraft operated at a different pace than 
Nabisco. At that time, Kraft had a portfolio 
of products considered back-of-the-shelf–
grocery. Nabisco had more of a fast-paced 
distribution model, with a product shelf 
life of around 12 months. Kraft products 
had a shelf life of more like two years. So 
once you changed to the Kraft pace to sell 
Nabisco products, it wouldn’t work.”
In terms of decision-making for 
Oreo, this was consolidated in the 
senior management team at company 
headquarters, which dictated central policy 
based on what worked well in established 
core markets. In 2004, Kraft had global 
revenues of US$32.2 billion, with Oreo 
sales accounting for some US$900 
million. Impressive as these figures were, 
the company had experienced steadily 
declining profits since 2001—with the 
most severe drops coming from Latin 
America and Asia Pacific operations. A 
key manager at Kraft headquarters once 
commented, “I am not sure why the Oreo 
has not been a success in China. It is the 
most successful biscuit in the world. It 
has gone from a regional favourite to the 
number one biscuit in so many markets; 
surely the winning combination of taste 
and brand will work in China if we just give 
it some time.”
the china market
In the nearly 10 years that Oreo had been in 
China, per capita GDP had risen from 
US$700 per person to US$2,100—a 
threefold increase. This rapid economic 






per capita gdp 









46 Vol. 1 / Asian Management Insights
CoMpetiNg CooKies
Across China, competition in the biscuit 
market was strong. Despite Kraft’s overall 
number one position, the company was 
trailing behind the competition in regions 
outside the north. Oreo’s sales began to 
erode as competing biscuit sales grew. 
Chun remarked, “When Oreo was first 
introduced in China, the types of biscuits 
in the Chinese market were limited. The 
majority of the market was in sweet or 
savoury plain crackers. At its launch, Oreo 
was considered a good innovation as it was 
in a sandwich cookie format. But as we got 
into the later years, we started to see all 
different forms of biscuits appearing on the 
market. Some of these products did quite 
well, like sandwich biscuits introduced by 
Taiwanese companies.”
Taiwan-based Master Kong led the 
sandwich biscuit category with two brands 
that together held a national share of 32 
percent of the market, well ahead of Oreo’s 
19 percent. Master Kong brands were less 
sweet than Oreo, and more to the taste of 
the average Chinese consumer’s palate. It 
was also offered in smaller packaging than 
Oreo, and contained just three biscuits. 
However, since most packaging in China 
contained only two biscuits, Master Kong 
packages were perceived by consumers to 
be of good value. 
selliNg at a preMiuM
Oreo was priced at a premium and 
noticeably more expensive than 
competing brands on a per biscuit basis. 
On a per package basis, the absolute 
price of buying Oreo was dramatically 
higher because of the large package size. 
Distributors believed that the higher price 
and larger package size was a key factor 
behind the poor sales. There were other 
concerns too.
DistributioN
Premium biscuits, like Oreo, generally 
contributed a smaller share of the final 
sale to the distribution partner. Kraft 
estimated that 60 percent of Oreo’s final 
sale price went to the distributor, whereas 
value biscuits, such as Master Kong brands, 
gave 70 percent of the final sale price to 
the distributor.
In stores, Oreo was given shelf space 
in proportion to how well it sold. Unlike 
the U.S., where companies could pay for 
more favourable shelf space, most grocery 
stores and hypermarkets in China would 
arrange their shelves based on their own 
sales data. Although they would sell end-
cap space or prominent one-time displays, 
the most desirable shelf space in the aisles 
was reserved for best sellers – which did not 
include Oreo.
In 2004, 50 percent of all biscuit sales 
came from super/hypermarkets. Although 
corner stores were the fastest growing 
sales channel for biscuits, nonetheless, 
internationally-chained hypermarkets were 
very important to Kraft’s distribution 
strategy as they maintained an expansive 
network of locations. Whereas 65 percent 
of locally owned grocers had only one 
location, 60 percent of foreign chains had 
locations in at least five cities, with 30 
percent present in more than 16 cities.
iNveNtory woes
Kraft was not sitting idly as their biscuit 
sales tanked. In 2003, the company 
increased marketing and communications 
spend by 40 percent in China—but the 
consumers did not respond. By 2004, 
shipments for their entire biscuit line 
were down 12 percent. Moreover, higher 
than expected inventories were driving up 
storage costs, and much of the stock had to 
be thrown out.
In late 2005, while Warren was 
wondering how to salvage the Oreo in 
China, he went back to a market research 
study that had been completed earlier that 
year in July. The study tested a new Oreo 
product, LightSweet Oreo against the 
regular Oreo, and it revealed what the local 
Favourable improvements in import 
policy were also occurring. Market-
oriented reforms hit a milestone in 2001 
when China was admitted into the World 
Trade Organization. A strong growing 
economy and the rise of the Chinese 
consumer in the world’s most populous 
country had become an enticing opportunity 
for foreign companies.
Several foreign companies had 
impressive successes early on. Hypermarkets, 
first introduced in 1995, were well suited 
to take advantage of upwardly mobile 
Chinese consumers. More and more of 
these stores were opening in cities across 
the country. Between 1999 and 2004, 
their sales increased by 147 percent. This 
growth was expected to continue as China 
became more urbanised. For instance, in 
1996 only 32 percent of China’s 
population lived in cities, but by 2005 this 
number had reached 50 percent of the 
country’s 1.2 billion people. By 2020, 
urbanisation was projected to reach 60 
percent. Prospects for hypermarkets, and 
by extension, the packaged food category 
looked bright. 
the issues at hand
the Merger
In 2005, bakery goods were the number 
one packaged food in China. As a bakery 
good, biscuits had done well—having grown 
by 8.4 percent annually between 1999 and 
2004, with sandwiched biscuits like Oreo 
growing at 7.5 percent. But as the market 
matured, this growth had slowed down.
Oreo had a successful initial launch in 
China and within three years, by 1999, had 
established a strong foothold. After Kraft 
acquired Nabisco, the merged company 
with its expanded product line had become 
the largest biscuit company in China, 
with a 10 percent market share in the 
category. Warren commented, “There was 
a fair amount of integration that happened 
pretty quickly, which created a fairly 
unwieldy brand portfolio.” It soon became 
apparent that the expanded portfolio was 
a collection of distinct brands, with non-
complementary sales efforts.
Warren worried that this larger portfolio 
was not being branded and distributed 
effectively. The company lacked the focus 
and sufficient spend on any one brand, and 
by attempting to concentrate on all brands 
they ended up concentrating on none.
After the merger, sales of Oreo had 
been flat—growing at just over four percent 
annually. Warren recalled, “When it was 
launched, we used the U.S. product, the 
U.S. formulation, and the U.S. advertising 
strategy, which was very much the global 
practice. But growth between 2000-2004 
was stagnant. Four percent is not good 
enough in China; anything below 10 
percent is not growing at all.”
This was extremely frustrating for the 
local office, which felt they had little say in 
major decisions about Oreo. In particular, 
decisions about pricing and product 
innovation were completely centralised.
a uNiversal paCKage
From 1996 to 2005, Oreo’s primary 
sales channel in China continued to be the 
medium-size grocery stores and foreign-
chained hypermarkets such as Tesco 
and Carrefour. The biscuits came in the 
standard packaging that was used in other 
geographies—which was based on the U.S. 
packaging that contained three partitioned 
rows of 12 Oreos. Chun discussed the 
package size with Warren, “The current 
production is manufacturer-driven as they 
prefer producing packaged rows of all the 
same length, since it gave better efficiency 
and output. But if we need to satisfy the 
customer, we might need to change.” 
Kraft would also run bonus pack 
promotions with extra Oreos in the standard 
package size. This had been a highly 
successful strategy in the U.S., where 
having additional Oreos in the package 
strengthened the consumers’ perceived value. 
There was a fair amount 
of integration that 
happened pretty quickly, 
which created a fairly 
unwieldy brand portfolio. 
32%
lived in cities (1996)
50%
lived in cities (2005)
60%
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team members already knew -- that Chinese 
consumers preferred a less-sweet biscuit.
CustoMer waNts
The study, however, could only estimate 
a preference for LightSweet at a 90 
percent confidence interval. Policy at 
Kraft required a 95 percent confidence 
to launch a new product line, and several 
new product launches had recently already 
been cancelled. Convincing headquarters 
to go ahead with LightSweet Oreo would 
be difficult. Warren elaborated on the 
company’s reluctance, “If you look back 
at it from 1912 to 1975, we did not have 
a single variant of the Oreo, just the black 
and white cookie. Even in 1975, when the 
Double Stuffed came out, the only change 
was the extra amount of crème. The next 
actual flavour took almost 100 years and 
came out in 2001, which was chocolate. 
The original Oreo is what got us here.”
Regardless, something had to be done 
quickly if the Oreo was to stay in China. 
A debate ensued—should the company 
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focus on the core brands that had been 
underperforming, or spend a lot of time 
and money on launching new flavours 
and varieties? Warren recalled Chun’s 
comment, “We need a mind-set shift and to 
place a foundation for future success. We 
have to decide what we want to achieve as 
the Oreo brand in China and how we can 
reset our strategies to get there.”
recognising the problem
The Oreo was too sweet for most Chinese 
consumers and the packaging too large 
to appeal to purchase occasions. The 
promotional strategy was no-good either. 
The Oreo was still a new product for 
many people in China, and they were not 
interested in buying a month’s worth of 
Oreos, having never tried them. Yet, the 
large size of the Oreo package presented 
exactly this dilemma.
The problem, as Warren put it, 
“was that we were looking for American 
consumers in China”. The Oreo in 
China simply focused too much on the 
global market, and not enough on the 
local market. It essentially had its name 
translated into the local language and 
dropped into China. Market research 
may have helped address these problems 
early on, but by no means would it have 
guaranteed the biscuit’s success. 
By 2005, it was apparent that there 
were so many challenges that needed to be 
addressed, that for a turnaround to work, a 
number of interrelated problems had to be 
solved at the same time. Addressing only a 
few of these would not yield the dramatic 
results that the company needed.
Many of the issues that Kraft 
experienced in China originated from 
central policy and decision-making that 
took place in the U.S. Senior managers, 
who had never even visited the countries 
where Kraft was operating, were the ones 
developing strategy for those places. 
This was, in fact, a Kraft-wide problem. 
Moreover, the team in China too was not 
very local, and comprised many expatriates 
and Westerners.
There was also a strong culture in 
place that felt the formulation of Oreo 
was untouchable.
Oreo in China needed a vision shift, 
but these factors made for a hard sell. 
Nonetheless, it was becoming evident that 
a change in Oreo in China’s marketing and 
communication strategy, along with an 
adaptation of product innovations to the 
local market, was the need of the hour.
A transformative solution...
nothing is sacred
In 2006, the CEO and Chairman of Kraft 
were replaced and a new management 
team was brought in. This, along with 
the poor sales in China, helped Warren 
convince central leadership to give him 
enough leeway to make changes. He said, 
“Giving empowerment to local managers 
made a big difference… If you looked at 
the board of management for Kraft China 
in 2006, there were a lot of expatriates 
and western folk around. If you look at the 
organisation today, almost 99 percent of 
our staff is Chinese, which makes sense. 
The brand was at risk of elimination, and 
in the face of that, we were humble enough 
to listen to the consumer, put resources 
around it, and change.”
Kraft China refocused on six core 
brands in their biscuit line, including Oreo. 
The vision for Oreo was adjusted from the 
number one sandwich biscuit to the number 
one sweet snack in China. This paved the 
way for improved product innovation that 
catered to local tastes, which included an 
expansion of the Oreo brand into the wafer 
category and the launch of LightSweet Oreo. 
Distribution was also expanded beyond 
Kraft’s limited network in northern China. 
This would enable Oreo sales to grow 
alongside the booming hypermarkets. As 
Warren said, “[The Oreo] was too 
expensive… we didn’t have the right 
distribution capacity and the manufacturing 
and cost structure were not very attractive.”
Packaging decisions were shifted from 
the manufacturer’s prerogative to local 
offices that understood customer wants 
and perceived value. In addition, customer 
trials were boosted by a subtle campaign 
around in-store samples.
looking back
Oreo in China became a huge success. After 
the changes, the brand took off. Warren 
looked back, “When I first came to China 
in 2005, Oreo sales were US$20 million 
in China, and today (March 2012), seven 
years later, it’s almost US$400 million—
growing nearly 20 times in that time.”
He added, “We changed the business 
from the ground up, to move away from 
headquarters. The price point, for example, 
was being decided from Chicago. The 
company also made a significant change, 
and now key decisions are being made from 
managers who are closest to the company.”
These experiences changed the way 
Kraft operated as a company into a truly 
Glo-Cal (global-local) enterprise.
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